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Abstract 
 
 
We examine the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry in 83 economies over the 
2005-2013 period. The empirical findings show that foreign bank presence exerts a positive 
and significant effect on firm entry. This effect subdues in countries with strong creditor 
rights, while it strengthens in economies with high depth of credit information sharing. In 
further analysis, we find that the type of credit information sharing provider matters. The 
positive effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry strengthens in the presence of a private 
credit bureau, whereas it subdues in the presence of a public credit registry. Finally, we find 
some evidence that cultural and information sharing distance between home and host 
economies weakens the positive effect of foreign bank presence on firm entry. In terms of 
policy, attracting foreign banks while strengthening credit information sharing through 
private credit bureaus could benefit entrepreneurship in host economies.  
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1. Introduction 
The globalization of business is a major feature of the global economy. The banking sector is 
not an exception to this trend. Claessens and Van Horen (2014a, 2015) show a growing 
presence of foreign banks in most economies from 1995 to 2013. As a result, academics and 
policy makers are keen to investigate the effect of foreign banks on the performance of the 
banking sector and on credit allocation in the host economies. This paper relates to the latter 
strand of the foreign banking literature as it examines the effect of foreign bank presence on 
entrepreneurship in a cross-country empirical framework. In essence, we attempt to answer 
the question: Does foreign bank presence promotes or inhibits new firm entry?  
This question is of importance given the increase in foreign bank presence worldwide and the 
benefits of entrepreneurship for development. Entrepreneurship is a key contributor to the 
economic growth and dynamism of a country (Caves, 1998; Bartelsman et al., 2004). It could 
increase competition (Cohen and Klepper, 1992), the transfer of resources from low to high 
productivity activities (Bartelsman et al., 2003) and the generation, dissemination and 
application of innovative ideas that enhance firm productivity (Nickell, 1996). Furthermore, 
entrepreneurship decreases the unemployment rate (Branstetter et al., 2004; Siemer, 2014). 
These benefits of entrepreneurship have induced policymakers, especially in the aftermath of 
the crisis, to place policies that encourage new firm creation in the top of their agenda 
(Klapper and Love, 2011a). 
Given the significance of entrepreneurship in the policy agenda there is a burgeoning 
research on the determinants of cross-country heterogeneity in the rate of new firm entry 
(Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; Bruno et al., 2013; Ardagna and Lusardi, 2010; 
Da Rin et al., 2011; Klapper and Love, 2014; Klapper et al., 2015). These studies concentrate 
on the effect of business regulations such as entry regulation and taxation as well institutional 
quality on new firm entry. Most of this research employs access to finance as a control 
variable, usually proxied by the level of financial development, and find that it has a positive 
association with entrepreneurship. Another strand of the literature relates explicitly to the 
effect of the structure of the financial industry on new firm entry (Cetorelli and Strahan, 
2006; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Aghion et al., 2007). These studies find 
that more competition in the banking industry, as well as a higher level of private credit, have 
a positive effect on new firm entry. Thus, there is a consensus in the literature that financing 
conditions matter for entrepreneurship. However, the presence of foreign banks, an important 
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aspect of cross-country variation in financing conditions, has not been adequately examined 
with regards to its impact on entrepreneurship rates
1
.  
The extant literature on the effect of foreign banks presence on access to firm credit points 
into two directions. This first is that foreign banks due to geographic and cultural distance 
constraints (Mian, 2006), their hierarchical structure (Stein, 2002) and their reliance on 
lending technologies that depend on “hard” financial information (Beck et al., 2016) face a 
high degree of information asymmetry especially vis-à-vis small, young and opaque domestic 
borrowers. In line with this direction, a stream of studies finds that foreign bank presence 
benefits the access to finance for borrowers that are foreign, large and more transparent 
(Detragiache et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2011; Pennathur and Vishwasrao, 2014). The second 
is that foreign banks have developed advanced lending technologies, such as credit scoring as 
well as leasing and asset-based lending, designed to serve opaque domestic borrowers 
(Berger and Udell, 2006; De Haas and Naaborg, 2006; De la Torre et al., 2010). Therefore, 
foreign banks could overcome the information asymmetries between them and opaque 
borrowers and thus improve access to credit for the latter. Furthermore, foreign banks could 
benefit access to credit for opaque borrowers indirectly by forcing domestic banks to shift 
their credit portfolios towards the latter (Degryse et al., 2012). A stream of studies provides 
empirical evidence that foreign bank presence improves the access to finance also for smaller, 
opaque and young firms (Clarke et al., 2002, Beck et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2004; Gianetti 
and Ongena, 2012). 
The above findings although inconclusive point to a common element: the effect of foreign 
banks on access to credit for opaque domestic borrowers largely depends on the interplay 
between the information asymmetries they face in the host economy and the competitive 
advantages they possess in terms of lending technology that would enable them to overcome 
such information asymmetries. Since candidate new firm entrants are one of the most 
informationally opaque credit market segments because of the absence of historical records of 
their performance (Bulan and Yan, 2009; Chavis et al, 2011), the information asymmetries 
                                                          
1 To the best our knowledge there is only one study (Havrylchyk, 2012) that examines the impact of foreign 
bank presence on entrepreneurship for a sample of transition economies over the 2000-2005. However, there are 
some important differences between this paper and ours. The study of Havrylchyk (2012) focuses on few 
transition economies whereas our paper uses a global sample of 83 economies. Secondly, we utilise the recent 
foreign bank ownership dataset of Claessens and van Horen (2014a; 2015). This dataset represent the most 
diligent effort to measure accurately cross-country foreign bank presence. Thirdly and more importantly, our 
study takes into account conditioning effects due to important institutional arrangements (creditor rights and 
credit information sharing) that aim to alleviate the information asymmetry between banks and candidate 
borrowers. Finally, the study of Havrylchyk (2012) is for the 2000-2005 period while the timeline of our study 
(2005-2013) is wider and also includes the crisis and some of the post-crisis period. 
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between them and foreign banks could be particularly high. This, in combination with the fact 
that most studies that examine the effect of foreign bank presence on access to credit are 
inconclusive and focus on existing firms, justifies an empirical analysis with regards to the 
effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. 
It is also interesting to investigate for the existence of conditioning effects with regards to the 
effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship. Claessens and Van Horen (2014a) show 
that the effect of foreign banks on private credit depends largely on host country institutional 
characteristics. Therefore, we opt to examine for conditioning effects of characteristics that 
relate to the information asymmetry that foreign banks face in host economies especially in 
terms of the opaque borrower segments such as the market for entrepreneurial credit. Such 
conditioning effects could stem from the level of credit information sharing and creditor 
rights in the host economy. These are institutional arrangements that aim to alleviate the 
information asymmetry between creditors and borrowers (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2012). Credit Information 
sharing, by providing historical data on the past behavior of borrowers, could enable loan 
screening and thus reduce information asymmetry issues between banks and borrowers 
(Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Dierkes et al., 2013). Therefore, credit information sharing could 
serve as a proxy for the information asymmetry level that foreign banks face in host 
economies. Additionally, although information on candidate new firm entrants does not yet 
exist in the credit registries, information on their aspiring owners does. This could enable 
foreign banks to use the advanced lending technologies, such as credit scoring models, that 
they usually employ in order to serve the most opaque credit market segments, also in the 
market for entrepreneurial credit (Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2006). Creditor 
rights, by facilitating the use of collateral, could also reduce information asymmetry by 
enabling banks to screen borrowers efficiently (Bester, 1985; Berger et al., 2011). This could 
be useful for foreign banks in the market of entrepreneurial credit because entrepreneurs 
could post personal assets as collateral in order to obtain bank credit (Robb and Robinson, 
2013). 
Based on the above, the second question we attempt to answer in this study is the following:  
Do creditor rights and information sharing condition the effect of foreign bank presence on 
new firm entry?  
We employ a dataset of 83 economies over the 2005-2013 period and find, by using fixed-
effects, dynamic panel, instrumental variables (IV) and panel vector auto regression (VAR) 
models, that foreign bank presence exerts a positive and significant effect on new firm entry. 
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This is in accordance with studies that find that foreign bank presence could improve the 
access to credit for opaque domestic borrowers either directly through the employment of 
advanced foreign bank lending technologies (De Haas and Naaborg; 2006) or indirectly by 
incentivising domestic banks to serve the latter (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012)
2
. Furthermore, 
we find some evidence that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship 
strengthens in countries with higher levels of depth of credit information sharing. This could 
denote that credit information sharing could empower the lending technologies that foreign 
banks tend to rely on when they extend credit to opaque domestic borrowers (Beck et al., 
2011; Beck et al., 2016). We also find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on 
new firm entry subdues at higher levels of creditor rights. This result lends support to the 
findings of Bruno and Hauswald (2014) that foreign banks possess an advantage in debt 
contract enforcement in countries with weak legal structures.  
In further analysis, we find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence subdues at the 
presence of a public credit registry, while it strengthens when a private credit bureau is in 
place. These results could stem from the fact that these two types of credit registries differ 
significantly in the availability of credit information history they contain (OECD, 2010; 
World Bank, 2014). Finally, we also provide some evidence that cultural proximity between 
the home and host economies strengthens the positive effect of foreign bank presence on 
entrepreneurship, while distance in terms of information sharing weakens this effect. This 
shows that distance constraints do not operate only through geographic and cultural factors 
(Mian, 2006), but also through institutional factors that determine the level of the information 
asymmetry disadvantage foreign banks face in host economies  
These findings contribute to the literature in three ways. Firstly, we add to the 
entrepreneurship determinants literature (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2015; 
Belitski et al., 2016) and specifically to the literature that relates financing conditions to new 
firm formation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2007; Havrylchyk, 2012). Secondly, we add to the 
literature that examines the effects of foreign banks on the real economy of the host countries 
(e.g. De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012; Bruno and Hauswald, 
2014). Finally, we also add to the literature that investigates the effects of creditor rights and 
information sharing on firm credit (e.g. Brown et al., 2009; Grajzl and Laptieva, 2016; Love 
et al., 2016). 
                                                          
2
 The analysis in this paper highlights the possible channels through which foreign bank presence could affect 
new firm entry. However, the use country-level data (i.e. we do not observe bank-firm relationships) renders 
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate if new firm entrants could benefit directly from foreign bank lending 
or indirectly because foreign bank presence could alter the lending policies of domestic banks.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents some theoretical 
considerations and develops hypotheses, sections 3 and 4 present the data and the methods 
respectively, section 5 reports and discusses the results, whilst the final section offers some 
concluding comments together with some policy implications.  
2. Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
 
According to the “home advantage” hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000) foreign banks operate 
less efficiently than domestic banks because the former face high “liability of foreignness” in 
a given host economy. An important component of the “liability of foreignness” that foreign 
banks face is the high level of information asymmetry between them and domestic borrowers. 
This could be attributed to two sources. The first relates to the distance constraints (Mian, 
2006) that foreign banks face in a given host country. A foreign bank may be headquartered 
in a very different market environment, with a different language, culture and so forth. This 
renders costly for foreign banks collecting and processing information on local borrowers. 
The second source of information asymmetry between foreign banks and local borrowers 
relates to the hierarchical structure of the former. This renders them less able to put an effort 
in acquiring “soft” information on local borrowers (Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005). On the 
contrary, foreign banks tend to rely on “hard” information on local borrowers. This “hard” 
information should be credible and publicly verifiable, such as a firm’s audited financial 
accounts (Mian, 2006; Berger and Black, 2011).  
It would be rational then to expect that foreign banks will tend to serve the more transparent 
domestic firms in the host economy as the theoretical model of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
(2004) predicts. In support of this model, Detragiache et al. (2008) find that foreign banks, by 
“cherry-picking” the most transparent domestic borrowers, lead to a decline in aggregate 
credit which disproportionally affects opaque domestic borrowers who find themselves in a 
worse borrower pool that faces prohibitively high interest rates. In another microeconometric 
study, Pennathur and Vishwasrao (2014) find that foreign banks prefer to lend to financially 
transparent firms. Similar findings are evident also in other studies (Berger et al., 2001; 
Berger et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2011). 
The above considerations put less transparent domestic borrowers in disadvantage in terms of 
foreign bank financing in comparison with more transparent ones. Potential new firm entrants 
in a given credit market could be in an even more disadvantaged position from the foreign 
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bank financing standpoint than established (existing) domestic firms because the latter type of 
firms could cater foreign banks with more “hard” information in comparison with the former. 
Thus, foreign bank presence, by exacerbating the disadvantage of information provision that 
potential new firm entrants face vis-à-vis existing firms in the host economy, could inhibit 
new firm entry. Based on the above discussion the first hypothesis (H1.A) is the following: 
H1.A: Foreign bank presence decreases new firm entry 
 
On the other hand, a higher level of foreign bank presence could promote new firm entry in 
host economies. Berger et al. (2000) introduce also the “global advantage” hypothesis, which 
posits that foreign banks possess strong competitive advantages, especially in terms of 
lending and information technologies, in comparison with domestic banks. Thus, foreign 
banks could overcome the “liability of foreignness” in terms of information asymmetry with 
opaque borrowers.  
Berger and Udell (2006) propose a new paradigm of bank financing to opaque borrowers that 
involve also foreign bank lending. In their paradigm, foreign banks are able to provide credit 
to less transparent clients by employing transactional technologies that facilitate arms-length 
financing. An important such technology is the so-called small business credit scoring. This 
involves the entry of basic data, also on the personal history of the firm owner, into models 
that predict future loan performance. This is particularly useful for lending to very opaque 
firms since for such entities, the creditworthiness of the firm and the owner are closely related 
(Feldman, 1997; Mester, 1997). Foreign banks could also employ asset-based lending and 
leasing in order to extend credit to opaque borrowers. In asset-based lending, the bank looks 
mainly at the underlying assets as the primary source of repayment while in leasing the leesor 
(lender) owns an asset and rents it to a leese (Berger and Udell, 2006). In support of this 
paradigm, several studies find that foreign banks, by developing such lending technologies, 
increase lending to opaque domestic borrowers (Clarke et al., 2005; De Haas and Naaborg, 
2006; De la Torre et al., 2010).  
The paradigm of Berger and Udell (2006) refers to existing firms and not specifically to 
potential new entrant firms but it could also apply to the latter. For example, foreign banks, in 
the absence of firm-specific “hard” information, could obtain such information on the 
aspiring owner of a new firm and employ credit scoring technologies to predict future loan 
performance. 
This conforms to previous research that finds that banks apply credit scoring models that use 
as inputs personal information on the owner in order to finance risky opaque firms outside 
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their local market (Frame and Woosley,2004; Berger et al., 2005). The use of asset-based 
lending by foreign banks could also promote new firm entry. This lending technology, 
according to Berger and Udell (2006), could use as collateral the personal assets of a firm’s 
owners and thus is compatible with the findings of Robb and Robinson (2013) that 
entrepreneurs obtain start-up bank financing by posting personal assets as collateral.  
There is another potential channel through which higher foreign bank presence could increase 
new firm entry rates. This is an indirect channel and involves the reaction of domestic banks 
to higher levels of foreign bank presence. It could be the case that incumbent domestic banks 
would increase credit supply to opaque local borrowers, such as aspiring new firm entrants, 
as a reaction to the reduced supply of credit to such borrowers by foreign banks. Giannetti 
and Ongena (2012) provide microeconometric evidence that foreign banks indirectly promote 
the access to credit for more opaque borrowers that previously did not have an established 
bank relationship. This modification in the behavior of domestic banks is one of the 
explanations given by Clarke et al. (2001) to support their findings that higher foreign bank 
presence improves the financing conditions of small and less transparent firms. Given that 
aspiring entrepreneurs form one of the least transparent segments of the credit market, 
domestic banks might be more willing to serve them if they face fierce competition by 
foreign banks in the transparent segments of the credit market.  
Based on the above discussion we formulate the competing to H1.A hypothesis, H1.B, as 
follows: 
H1.B: Foreign bank presence increases new firm entry 
 
2.2 The conditioning effects of creditor rights and information sharing  
 
Creditor rights have the potential to decrease the information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. In a strong creditor rights environment, banks are able to use collateral 
requirements to differentiate the risk level of the projects of seemingly comparable loan 
applicants. This reduction in adverse selection happens through a signaling channel. 
Candidate borrowers with lower risk projects, and thus lower risk of loan default, post higher 
levels of collateral that candidate borrowers with higher risk projects would not be willing to 
post (Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Godlewski and Weill, 2011). Therefore, strong creditor 
rights could facilitate the use of collateral as a singling device for banks and thus increase 
credit towards entrepreneurs. Schmalz et al. (2013) provide microeconometric evidence that 
the use of personal assets as collateral increases entrepreneurial activity.  
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The usefulness of collateral in the provision of entrepreneurial credit could be more important 
for foreign banks than domestic banks. In the theoretical model of Sengupta (2007) foreign 
banks use the signaling nature of collateral in order to compete successfully with domestic 
banks. In support of this model, Haselmann et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that 
foreign banks increase their lending considerably more than domestic banks after legislative 
changes that facilitate the use of collateral. Furthermore, some lending technologies, such as 
asset-based lending, that foreign banks could use in order to provide finance to opaque 
domestic borrowers depend on the use of collateral (Berger and Udell, 2006). Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is the following:  
H2.A: Creditor rights strengthen (moderate) the positive (negative) effect of foreign bank 
presence on new firm entry. 
However, it could be the case that foreign banks would be more able to promote new firm 
entry in a lower creditor rights environment. Empirical evidence from Bruno and Hauswald 
(2014) suggests that foreign banks possess an advantage in debt contract enforcement in an 
uncertain legal environment. One potential reason could be the development by foreign banks 
of lending technologies that do not depend on creditor rights, as for example advance credit 
scoring technologies for opaque business lending (De la Torre et al., 2010). Such lending 
technologies are based on “hard” information mainly on the owner (or on the aspiring owner 
in the case of new firm entry) of an opaque firm (Berger and Udell, 2006). In this way, 
foreign banks could assess the creditworthiness of a potential owner of a new firm without 
relying on the signaling channel that strong creditor rights could facilitate. Additionally, some 
other lending technologies , such as leasing, that foreign banks could employ in order to 
finance the opaque credit market segment of entrepreneurial credit, do not involve the 
transfer of asset ownership to the borrower, thus rendering creditor rights less relevant. 
Furthermore, in a strong creditor rights environment, there could be a shift in the composition 
of foreign bank credit towards mortgage lending. This shift could render obtaining 
entrepreneurship credit from foreign banks less probable. In line with this argument, De Haas 
et al. (2010) find that when foreign banks perceive collateral regulation to be of high quality 
they focus more on mortgage lending. Based on the above discussion we formulate the 
competing to H2.A hypothesis as follows: 
H2.B: Creditor rights moderate (strengthen) the positive (negative) effect of foreign bank 
presence on new firm entry. 
Information sharing could reduce the information asymmetry issues that banks face in a 
credit market by providing them with information about the past behavior borrowers (Pagano 
 
 
9 
 
and Jappelli, 1993). Several studies provide empirical evidence (Kallberg and Udell, 2003; 
Dierkes et al., 2013; Bos et al., 2016) that information sharing reduces adverse selection and 
leads to efficient loan screening. A lower level of information asymmetries due to credit 
information sharing could lead to a higher level of private sector credit in an economy 
(Djankov et al., 2007) especially towards opaque and young firms that cannot directly 
provide banks with “hard” information such as a lengthy history of audited financial 
statement accounts (Brown et al., 2009; Martínez Pería and Singh, 2014). Thus, information 
sharing could serve as proxy for the level of information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers in a country especially as far as concerns the opaque credit markets segments such 
as the market for entrepreneurial credit.  
A lower level of information asymmetries in the credit market could be particularly important 
for foreign banks when they extend credit to opaque domestic borrowers because of the 
disadvantage of foreign banks in using “soft” borrower information (Gormley, 2010). In line 
with this, Claessens and Van Horen (2014a) find that foreign banks have a negative effect on 
private credit in countries with limited information sharing. Therefore, a high level of 
information sharing, by reducing information asymmetries, could alleviate the “cherry 
picking” behavior of foreign banks and the associated negative effects it could have in the 
overall extension of credit especially in the opaque segments of the credit market 
(Detragiache et al., 2008). This could also benefit the access to entrepreneurial credit which is 
one of the least transparent segments of the credit market. 
A mechanism through which the low level of information asymmetries that information 
sharing facilitates could benefit the provision of entrepreneurial credit by foreign banks is the 
empowerment of the lending technologies they could employ for such type of lending. Firm-
specific information on candidate new firm entrants might not yet exist in the credit 
registries, but personal information on aspiring entrepreneurs does. This could enable the use 
of lending technologies, such as credit scoring models that foreign banks could use in order to 
provide credit to opaque borrowers (De la Torre et al., 2010), also in the market for 
entrepreneurial credit (Black and Strahan, 2002). This conforms to the fact that credit scoring 
lending technologies for opaque firms tend to rely extensively on “hard” information on the 
personal history of a firm’s owner that banks source from credit bureaus (Berger and Udell, 
2002; Berger and Frame, 2007; Berger et al., 2011). In line with this argument, Beck et al. 
(2016) provide evidence that the sharing of “hard” information, such as borrower ratings, 
through the credit registry partly eliminates the informational disadvantage of foreign banks 
when extending loans to opaque borrowers.  
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Through another channel, increased information sharing could induce foreign banks to 
increase their provision of credit in the host economy because of the disciplinary effect 
information sharing have on borrowers (Klein, 1992). Information sharing could induce firm 
managers to perform well in order to avoid a loan default that would blacklist themselves or 
their firm and as a result, they could be excluded from future bank financing (Padilla and 
Pagano, 1997; 2000). This could also apply in the market for entrepreneurial credit as once 
aspiring entrepreneurs obtain credit from foreign banks the information on this transaction 
enters the credit information provider. 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate our third hypothesis, H3, as follows: 
H3: Information sharing strengthens (moderates) the positive (negative) effect of foreign 
bank presence on new firm entry.  
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 New firm entry  
The dependent variable of our study is new firm entry density (ENT). This is defined as the 
number of newly registered companies per 1,000 working-age people (ages 15–64) per year3. 
We source the data on firm entry density from the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database. 
This database comprises a cross-country, time-series panel dataset of the number of newly 
formed companies. The dataset is consistent and comparable across heterogeneous legal 
regimes and economic systems and has been used widely in the recent literature on the 
determinants of new firm entry (Klapper and Love, 2011b; Braunerhjelm and Eklund, 2014; 
Klapper and Love, 2014; Klapper et al., 2015; Belitski et al, 2016). For reasons of 
consistency, data availability, and relevance to high growth entrepreneurship the dataset 
focuses on limited liability firms (Klapper et al., 2010). Furthermore, this legal form of 
business is the most prevalent globally (Doing Business, 2010). The dataset is available for 
most economies globally over the 2004-2014 period with a limited number of missing 
observations. To conform to the previous literature (see for example Klapper and Love, 
2014), we exclude from our analysis observations from economies that are defined as 
                                                          
3
 In robustness checks we also use an alternative measure of entrepreneurship: this is the nascent 
entrepreneurship sourced from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). We have extensively reviewed the 
literature on the determinants of new firm entry in a cross-country framework. The new firm entry rate from the 
World Bank Entrepreneurship Database together with the GEM measure of entrepreneurship are the most 
commonly employed variables in the literature to capture country-level entrepreneurship. 
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“offshore financial centers” by the IMF as they might reflect the creation of shell companies 
and not active firms. Our final dataset, taking into account the availability of the explanatory 
variables comprises of 632 observations for 83 countries over the 2005-2013 period. The 
countries that we include in this study are available in Table A1 of the appendix. 
 
3.1.2 Foreign bank presence 
 
For the foreign bank presence variable, we utilize the bank ownership dataset of Claessens 
and van Horen (2014a, 2015). There are three major advantages of this dataset. The first is 
that it provides the specific point in time when a foreign bank entered a host economy. This 
gives a precise within-country time variation of the foreign bank presence during the period 
of the study. The second advantage is that Claessens and van Horen (2014a, 2015) consider 
also some other critical issues such as the exit of a foreign bank from the host economy, 
mergers and acquisitions and avoidance of double counting. Furthermore, this dataset 
provides information on the home economy of each foreign bank. The above advantages 
render the Claessens and van Horen (2014a, 2015) dataset the most comprehensive effort to 
date in terms of foreign bank presence measurement. In this dataset, a bank is defined as 
foreign, in accordance with the banking literature, when 50% or more of the specific bank’s 
equity is owned by foreigners. The authors construct two indices of foreign bank presence. 
The first is the ratio in each economy of foreign banks over the total number of banks and the 
second measure is the ratio of foreign-owned bank assets over the total bank assets. In this 
study, we employ the second ratio, (FBAST), because it provides a better measure of the 
magnitude of foreign bank presence and is the one that the bank literature employs (Brown et 
al., 2009; Cull and Martínez Pería, 2013; Bruno and Hauswald, 2014)
4
. 
 
3.1.3 Creditor rights, information sharing, and control variables 
 
To account for creditor rights and information sharing at the country level we use the 
“Getting Credit” category of regulations from the “Doing Business” project of the World 
Bank. More specifically, we employ the creditor rights index (CR) which measures the extent 
to which bankruptcy and collateral legislation defends the rights of lenders. This index ranges 
                                                          
4
 The first ratio, the number of foreign banks divided by the total number of banks in a country, may provide a 
better measure of foreign bank presence in terms of entry. The two ratios of foreign bank presence are highly 
correlated (correlation stands at around 0.8, see Table A2 in appendix) and estimations using either of these two 
ratios of foreign bank presence produce qualitatively similar results. Therefore, in our main analysis we present 
the results using the ratio of foreign banks assets over total bank assets (FBAST) as a measure of foreign bank 
presence. In the robustness checks section of this paper we also present results using the ratio of the number of 
foreign banks over total banks (FBNUM). 
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from 0-10 with higher values denoting stronger creditor rights protection. To account for 
information sharing we use the depth of credit information index (DEPTH). This variable is 
an indicator for the richness of information related to the scope, coverage and accessibility of 
the information existing in each country’s state-owned credit registry or private credit bureau. 
The values of this index range from 0 to 6 for each economy and higher values represent 
higher levels of informational depth. Both of these indices are widely used in the banking 
literature (Houston et al., 2010; Claessens and van Horen, 2012; Bruno and Hauswald, 2014). 
The control variables are drawn from the literature on the determinants of firm entry (Da Rin 
et al., 2011; Klapper and Love, 2011b; Bruno et al., 2013; Dreher and Gassenber, 2013; 
Klapper and Love, 2014). Firstly, we control for macroeconomic conditions. Thus, in our 
models, we include GDP growth (GDPgr) to account for economic growth dynamics and 
business cycles effects (Klapper et al., 2015). We also employ the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita in real terms (lnGDPcap) in order to control for the general level of economic 
development (Bruno et al., 2013; Dreher and Gassenber, 2013). Additionally, we use the ratio 
of private sector credit to GDP (PSC) to control for the level of financial development 
(Klapper et al., 2006; Dreher and Gassenber, 2013). Finally, we account for the value added 
from agriculture as a percentage of GDP (AGRIC) as an alternative proxy for development 
(Dreher and Gassenber, 2013). We source these variables from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.  
The second set of control variables are proxies of the regulatory conditions in the host 
economy. To this end, we use several regulatory variables, relevant for new firm entry, from 
the “index of economic freedom” of the Heritage Foundation. The various fields of this index 
range from 0 to 100 with higher values denoting less regulatory burden. In particular, we use 
the business freedom index (BUSFREE), which measures the ability to start, operate and 
close a business in an economy. We expect that new firm entry will have a positive 
association with less regulatory hurdles in establishing a new firm (Klapper et al., 2006; 
Klapper and Love, 2011b). We also use the fiscal freedom index (FISCFREE) which is a 
measure of the tax burden that the government imposes on the firms and individuals in a 
given country. Theoretical models (Cullen and Gordon, 2007) and empirical evidence 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006; Da Rin et al., 2011) suggest that higher taxation deters firm 
entry.  
The government freedom index (GOVFREE) is also included in our models. This index 
reflects the level of government expenditures (including consumption and transfers) as a ratio 
of GDP. The inclusion of this variable follows the analysis of Aidis et al. (2012) who find 
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that the entrepreneurship rates are inversely related to the size of the government. 
Additionally, to control for government imposed frictions in the financial industry we use the 
financial freedom (FINFREE) component of the “index of economic freedom”. The inclusion 
of this index in the analysis is important in order to ensure that the foreign presence variable 
does not merely reflect privatisation. 
Furthermore, we employ the overall regulatory quality index (REGWB) from the World 
Bank Governance Indicators to account for the ability of governments to design and 
implement regulation beneficial to private sector development. This regulatory quality index 
is a composite index that takes into account regulatory quality in all areas of the economy. It 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values denoting a better regulatory framework. The use 
of this index eases omitted variable concerns with regards to types of regulation other than 
ones that we specifically include in the models. Moreover, in order to ensure that the foreign 
bank presence variable in our analysis does not capture an effect related to general inward 
FDI (Kouretas and Tsoumas, 2016) we include in our models as control variable the ratio of 
FDI inflows to GDP (INFDI). We source this variable from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. Finally, in order to control for the level of 
competition in the banking industry in each economy we use the concentration ratio as 
measured by the assets of the three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial 
banking assets (C3). The inclusion of this control variable is important because the 
competitive conditions in the banking industry could affect new firm entry (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006). We source the C3 variable from the Global Financial Development Database 
of the World Bank
5
. In Tables 1 and 2 we provide the detailed definition of the variables that 
we include in this study and some descriptive statistics. 
Table 1 and Table 2 
3.2 Methods 
We provide results from both fixed effects and dynamic panel specifications. The fixed effect 
estimator takes the following form: 
(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝛽1 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 
𝑛
𝑗=1 +𝛽3(𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4 (𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) +
𝑣𝑖+𝑚𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡]               
                                                                                                                                                             (1),                                                                    
                                                          
5
 In alternative estimations we use as a measure of competition in the banking industry the Lerner index at the 
country level. The Lerner index is also available in the Global Financial Development Database of the World 
Bank but is available for fewer years than the C3 ratio. Thus, we report the estimations that employ the C3 ratio 
as a measure of bank competition. The results are qualitatively similar when we employ the Lerner index as a 
measure of competition. 
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where (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the new firm entry measure observed in country i 
at time t, 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑇 is the natural logarithm of the measure of foreign bank presence, 𝐶𝑅 is the 
creditor rights index, 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 is the information sharing index, Control is a vector of control 
variables, 𝑣 are country fixed effects, 𝑚 are time effects and 𝑢 is the stochastic term. By 
employing country fixed effects we capture unobserved country heterogeneity. That is we 
account for all the time-invariant characteristics of the countries we include in our sample and 
could affect new firm entry rates (e.g. geographic position, culture etc.). By employing time 
effects we also account for shocks common to all countries, which is important in this study 
which encompass the years of the recent financial crisis. We perform the fixed effects 
estimations with robust standard errors.  
There are two important concerns though with the above identification strategy. The first is 
the potential persistence of entrepreneurship rates (Dutta and Sobel, 2016). The second is the 
potential endogeneity between the new firm entry rate (lnENT) and the foreign bank presence 
(lnFBAST) variable. It could be the case that foreign banks may find attractive to enter 
economies with high entrepreneurship rate (Havrylchyk, 2012). For these two reasons, we opt 
to estimate also dynamic models using the two-step system generalized method of moments 
estimator (GMM) as advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
using corrected robust standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).  
The two-step system GMM models include among the rest of the explanatory variables, one 
lag of the new firm entry rate variable (lnENT), and therefore, equation (1) takes the 
following form: 
(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇)𝑖,𝑡 = [𝑎0 + 𝛽1(𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∑ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑇)𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1 +𝛽4(𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽5 (𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) +𝑣𝑖 + 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡]             
                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a further explanatory variable in the model 
(2) accounts for the potential persistence of the new firm entry rate (𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇). Another virtue 
of the two-step system GMM estimator is that we can treat some of the explanatory variables 
as endogenous with the use of appropriate instruments. In our estimations we treat as 
endogenous the lagged dependent variable ((𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑁𝑇)𝑖,𝑡−1 ) as it is the standard in the literature, 
the foreign bank presence variable (𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑇) and the business freedom (BUSFREE) 
variable
6
. This suggests that we use the second lag of the dependent variable, of the foreign 
                                                          
6 Initially, we attempted to employ as endogenous variables just the lagged dependent variable (lnENTt-1) and 
the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST). In this case we obtain significant p-values for the Hansen J test. 
We find that by treating the lagged dependent variable (lnENTt-1), the foreign bank presence variable 
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bank presence variable and of the business freedom variable as instruments (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). The results of the two-step system GMM estimator are also 
verified by Hansen’s J test for instrument validity and the second-order autocorrelation of the 
error terms test, AR2, as introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Main Analysis 
Table 3 shows the estimations of the determinants of new firm entry for the 2005-2013 
period. The first model of Table 3 shows the baseline fixed effects results, while in the rest of 
the fixed effects models (2 to 4) we interact the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST) 
with the creditor rights (CR) and the information sharing (DEPTH) variables.  
Table 3 
The results of the baseline model 1 in Table 3 show that the foreign bank presence 
(lnFBAST) exerts a significant at the 5% level positive effect on new firm entry. This result 
provides evidence in support of hypothesis H1.B that foreign bank presence increases new 
firm entry.  
This result conforms with the literature that posits that foreign banks, by employing advanced 
lending technologies, could overcome the informational disadvantages that they face in the 
credit markets of the host economies and thus be able to facilitate lending to opaque 
borrowers (Clarke et al., 2005; De Haas and Naaborg, 2006; Bruno and Hauswald, 2014) 
such as aspiring entrepreneurs. Through another channel, foreign bank presence could have a 
positive effect on new firm entry indirectly by motivating domestic banks to increase their 
credit supply to less transparent clients (Clarke et al., 2001). There is empirical evidence 
showing that foreign banks tend to focus mostly on large and more transparent borrowers 
(Detragiache et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2011; Pennathur and Vishwasrao, 2014). However, a 
potential“cherry-picking” behaviour of foreign banks does need to necessarily lead to a 
decline in credit towards opaque borrowers, as in Detragiache et al. (2008), but could rather 
indirectly improve their access to credit for the latter as the findings of Giannetti and Ongena 
(2012) demonstrate.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(lnFBAST) and the business freedom (BUSFREE) variable as endogenous we obtain insignificant p-values for 
the Hansen J test. This suggests that the instruments are acceptable and the business freedom (BUSFREE) 
variable is better modelled as endogenous in the dynamic panel models. This also makes sense from a 
theoretical standpoint. The business freedom (BUSFREE) is a measure of regulation of firm entry and therefore 
it is rational to consider it as endogenous to the entrepreneurship rate. 
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The models that include the interaction terms between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and 
the creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (DEPTH) variables reveal some interesting 
findings. In model 2 of Table 4 the interaction between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) 
and creditor rights (CR) has a negative and significant at the 5% level effect on new firm 
entry while the individual effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) on new firm entry is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. In support of hypothesis H2.B, the positive effect of 
foreign bank presence on new firm entry subdues athigher levels of creditor rights. This 
implies that foreign bank presence is particularly useful for entrepreneurship in countries with 
poor legal infrastructure in terms of creditor rights. This result conforms to the findings of 
Bruno and Hauswald (2014) that foreign banks could substitute for insufficient legal 
infrastructure in host economies. A reason for this could be the development by foreign banks 
of advanced lending technologies to overcome legal uncertainty in host economies such as 
credit scoring technologies or leasing (Berger and Udell, 2006; De la Torre et al., 2010; Beck 
et al., 2016) and therefore be able to lend to the opaque segments of the credit market such as 
the market for entrepreneurial credit. Another potential channel through which the positive 
effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry could subdue at higher levels of creditor 
rights could be the shift of foreign bank lending towards mortgages that are the typical form 
of collateralised lending (De Haas et al., 2010). In model 3 of Table 3 we interact the foreign 
bank presence variable (lnFBAST) with the information sharing variable (DEPTH) and find 
that this interaction term has a positive but not statistically significant coefficient while the 
individual of the lnFBAST is positive and significant at the 5% level. This provides some 
tentative empirical evidence in support of hypothesis H.3 that information sharing could 
strengthen the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. In model 4 of 
Table 3 we include the interaction term between foreign bank presence and creditor rights 
and the interaction term between foreign bank presence and information sharing in the same 
model and the results we obtain are similar.  
In models 5 to 8 of Table 3 we provide the results of the dynamic panel estimations. The 
results of the baseline dynamic panel model 5 in Table 3 reveal that the lag of the dependent 
variable, the natural log of the new firm entry rate (lnENT), has a positive and significant at 
the 1% level coefficient. Furthermore, its large magnitude (0.897) denotes a high persistency 
of the new firm entry rate. This finding justifies the use of dynamic panel analysis in this 
study. With regards to the effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) on new firm entry we 
find that it is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level lending support to the 
empirical findings of the fixed effects models. In models 6 to 8 of Table 3 we include the 
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interaction terms of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) with creditor rights (CR) and 
information sharing (DEPTH).
7
 In model 6 of Table 3 we find that the interaction between 
foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and creditor rights (CR) is negative and significant at the 
1% level while the individual effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) on new firm entry 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. This provides further support to the results of the 
fixed effects models that foreign banks could particularly promote entrepreneurship in 
uncertain legal environments. In model 7 of Table 3 we find, similarly to the fixed effects 
estimations, that the interaction between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and information 
sharing (DEPTH) is positive but not statistically different from zero. However, in model 8 of 
Table 3, when we include all the interaction terms in the same dynamic panel specification, 
we find a positive and statistically significant at the 5% level coefficient for the 
lnFBAST*DEPTH interaction. This result provides some evidence that the positive effect of 
foreign bank presence on new firm entry strengthens at higher levels of credit information 
sharing in accordance with hypothesis H.3. Foreign banks seem to benefit new firm entry 
disproportionally in host economies in which they face a lower level of information 
asymmetries as proxied by credit information sharing. Therefore, credit information sharing 
could alleviate the negative effects of a potential foreign bank “cherry-picking” behaviour on 
the credit provision to opaque credit market segments, such as the market for entrepreneurial 
credit, as the findings of Detragiache et al. (2008) would suggest. One of the reasons could be 
that information sharing could empower the lending technologies that foreign banks employ 
to provide credit to opaque domestic borrowers. For example, personal information on the 
past borrowing behaviour of an aspiring entrepreneur, sourced from credit bureaus or 
registries, could be employed as input in the credit scoring models that foreign banks could 
use in the market for entrepreneurial credit (Berger and Udell, 2002; Black and Strahan, 
2002; Berger and Udell, 2006). Furthermore, higher levels of information sharing in the host 
economy could induce foreign banks to extend credit to more opaque borrowers, such as 
potential new firm entrants, because of the disciplinary effect information sharing could have 
on the latter (Klein, 1992).  
In order to enhance our analysis with regards to the conditioning effects stemming from the 
interaction between foreign bank presence and creditor rights we provide estimations using 
an alternative measure of creditor rights. More specifically, instead of interacting foreign 
                                                          
7
 Note that since in the dynamic panel analysis we treat foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) as endogenous, we 
also treat as endogenous the interaction terms of this variable with creditor rights (CR) and information sharing 
(DEPTH) (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). 
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bank presence with the creditor rights (CR) index, we interact it with a measure of rule of law 
(RLWB) in the host economies. We source the rule of law (RLWB) variable from the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank and it measures the degree of the contract 
enforcement, property rights and court efficiency. These results are available in models 9 and 
10 of Table 3. We provide estimations from both fixed-effects (model 9 of Table 3) and 
dynamic panel specifications (model 10 of Table 3). The results we obtain from these models 
are consistent with the results we obtained from the rest of the models in Table 3 and provide 
further evidence in support of the hypothesis H2.B. More specifically we find that in the 
models 9 and 10 of Table 3 the interaction term between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) 
and the rule of law (RLWB) is negative and significant. This result lends further support to 
the previous findings that the beneficial effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
subdues when contract enforcement regulation improves in line with Bruno and Hauswald 
(2014). 
With regards to the individual effects of creditor rights and information sharing we find, in 
most models of Table 3, that they have a positive association with new firm entry. This 
positive association of creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (DEPTH) with new firm 
entry is statistically significant in most models for the former variable. This finding 
underscores the importance of collateral in obtaining bank credit for entrepreneurial activities 
in line with the findings of Robb and Robinson (2013). Furthermore, this result provides 
further evidence that personal collateral from the aspiring entrepreneurs must often be posted 
to secure financing for new firm entry (Avery et al., 1998; Moon, 2009).  
Finally, in terms of the control variables we find in most specifications of Table 3 that new 
firm entry has a positive association with GDP growth and economic development 
(lnGDPcap) in line with the findings of Bruno et al. (2013) and Klapper et al. (2015). 
Additionally, business freedom (BUSFREE) has a positive and significant association with 
new firm entry in most specifications. This result highlights the importance of less stringent 
regulation of entry in facilitating entrepreneurship in line with the findings of Klapper et al. 
(2006). We also find that concentration ratio in the banking industry (C3) has a negative and, 
in some specifications, statistically significant association with new firm entry. This result is 
in line with the study of Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) who find that potential new firm 
entrants face greater difficulty in obtaining credit in less competitive bank markets. 
Furthermore, we find that limited government size (GOVFREE) has a positive and significant 
association with new firm entry in line with Aidis et al. (2012). 
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4.2 Further Analysis 
4.2.1 Conditional Effects of Different Types of Information Sharing Providers (Private Credit 
Bureaus Vs Public Credit Registries) 
So far the analysis provides evidence that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new 
firm entry strengthens at higher levels of depth of credit information sharing. In this section 
we go one step further and examine for conditioning effects with regards to the distinction of 
information sharing providers between public credit registries and private credit bureaus. This 
distinction is important as these two types of credit information providers can differ 
significantly in the availability of credit history and the associated information they might 
contain. OECD (2010) reports that private credit bureaus have some distinct advantages over 
public credit registries. Public credit registries collect information mainly on large borrowers, 
they are subject to stricter privacy laws and they usually do not provide additional services 
such as borrower credit ratings. Additionally, recent empirical evidence casts doubt on the 
reliability of the credit information available in the public credit registries (Giannetti et al., 
2016). Furthermore, some microeconometric studies find that it is the introduction of private 
credit bureaus, and not the introduction of public credit registries, that benefit the access to 
bank credit for opaque borrowers (Love and Mylenko, 2003; Martínez Pería and Singh, 2014; 
Grajzl and Laptieva, 2016). It could be the case therefore that private credit bureaus are more 
able than public registries to decrease the information asymmetries that foreign banks face in 
host economies especially as far as concerns the opaque credit market segments such as the 
one for entrepreneurial credit. In line with this argument, empirical evidence from Tsai et al. 
(2011) suggests that the presence of private credit bureaus is an important factor that foreign 
banks take into account when they decide where to locate internationally.  
Based on the above discussion we formulate the following hypothesis (H4): 
H4: The presence of a private credit bureau would be more beneficial than the presence of 
a public credit registry in terms of the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
To proceed to this type of analysis we follow an approach similar to Tsai et al. (2011) and 
construct two dummy variables that would indicate the presence of a) a public credit registry 
(PBDUM) and b) a private credit bureau (PVDUM). Therefore, we employ the public credit 
registry and private credit bureau coverage indices of the Doing Business dataset of the 
World Bank. More specifically, if a country at a specific year has a 0 % population and firm 
coverage through a public registry we assume the absence of a public credit registry. In a 
similar manner, we construct the dummy variable for the presence of a private credit bureau. 
The models that include the interaction terms between foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) and 
 
 
20 
 
the public credit registry (PBDUM) and private credit bureau (PVDUM) dummies are 
available in Table 4 (models 1-4). We provide results from the dynamic panel specifications 
as we obtain similar results with the fixed effects estimator.  
Table 4 
The empirical findings provide evidence in support of hypothesis H4. In models 1 and 3 of 
Table 4 we find that the interaction term between the presence of a private credit bureau and 
foreign bank presence (lnFBAST*PVDUM) enters with a positive coefficient which is 
statistically significant, at the 5% level, only in the former model. In model 4 we drop from 
the specification the depth of information sharing variable (DEPTH). This variable (DEPTH) 
reflects the richness of information sharing either from a private credit bureau or a public 
credit registry. Since private credit bureaus usually provide much richer information on 
borrowers than public credit registries, the inclusion of the DEPTH variable in the models 
could absorb explanatory power from the private credit bureau dummy
8
. Indeed, in model 4 
we find that the interaction between foreign bank presence and the private credit bureau 
dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level. These results provide evidence that the 
positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry strengthens in the presence of a 
private credit bureau. The existence of a private credit bureau, which contains also 
information on small borrowers and provides credit rating information (OECD 2010, World 
Bank, 2014), could be of importance for foreign banks in extending credit to the opaque 
credit market segments such as the one of entrepreneurial credit. This could be because 
“hard” information availability on small borrowers could decrease the information 
asymmetry between them and foreign banks by empowering the use of transaction-based 
lending technologies, such as credit scoring models, that the latter tend to rely on. It is also 
worth noting that in most specifications the individual effect of the private credit bureau 
dummy (PVDUM) has a positive and statistically significant association with new firm entry. 
This denotes that private credit bureaus could enhance credit availability to entrepreneurial 
activities also through the domestic banking sector. This is consistent with the recent 
empirical evidence from Martínez Pería and Singh (2014). 
With regards to the public credit registry dummy (PBDUM) we find in models 2, 3 and 4 of 
Table 4 that its interaction with foreign bank presence (lnFBAST*PBDUM) is negative and 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm 
                                                          
8
 The correlation (see Table A2 in the appendix) between the depth of information sharing (DEPTH) and the 
presence of private credit bureau dummy (PVDUM) is around 0.7, while it is only 0.066 with the public credit 
registry dummy (PBDUM). This provides evidence that private credit bureaus are the main source of the depth 
of information sharing in a given country. 
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entry subdues in the presence of a public credit registry. Public credit registries report 
information mostly on large firms with high credit exposure and large firms are a segment of 
the market favored by foreign banks (Pennathur and Vishwasrao, 2014). Therefore 
information on these firms might induce foreign banks to gear lending towards this type of 
firms and less on the more opaque segments of the credit market such as the market for 
entrepreneurial credit. This would be consistent with the findings of Detragiache et al. (2008).  
 
 
4.2.2 Conditional Effects of Distance Constraints between Home and Host Economies 
We further examine if distance constraints between the home and the host countries condition 
the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. Distance constraints between a bank’s 
headquarter and loan officers renders harder the reliance on “soft” information on local 
borrowers and therefore exacerbates information asymmetries (Stein, 2002; Liberti and Mian, 
2009). Therefore, geographic and cultural distance constraints could induce foreign banks to 
focus mostly on large and transparent borrowers in the host economy (Beck et al., 2016) and 
shy away from the least transparent credit markets segments such as the one for 
entrepreneurial credit. In line with this, Mian (2006) provides empirical evidence that 
geographic and cultural distance between foreign banks’ headquarters and branches in the 
host economy induces them to avoid lending to informationally opaque borrowers. In another 
study Berger et al. (2001) find that distant foreign banks face more hurdles to lend to less 
transparent borrowers in Argentina. However, it is not only geographic and cultural distance 
that could matter but also institutional distance. Ongena et al. (2013) show that home country 
institutional characteristics define the business model that foreign banks tend to export in the 
host economies and this affects their lending activities in the latter. It could be easier for a 
foreign bank to apply its business model and its advanced lending technologies in a familiar 
institutional environment in the host economy (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b). Based on 
the above discussion we formulate the following hypothesis (H5): 
H5: Geographic, cultural and institutional distance constraints (proximity) could 
negatively (positively) condition the effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
To test this hypothesis we interact variables that reflect geographic distance, cultural 
proximity and institutional distance in terms of creditor rights and credit information sharing 
with the foreign bank presence variable. To construct the distance and proximity variables we 
follow an approach similar to Delis et al. (2016). To this end, we calculate the weighted 
distance (proximity) between the multiple home countries related with the foreign banks 
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present in each host economy with the host economy. More specifically, we first calculate the 
distance (proximity) between each foreign country and a host economy for a given 
characteristic and then estimate a weighted average. We use as weights the ratio of each 
foreign country’s bank assets over the total foreign bank assets in each host economy. 
Therefore, the weighted distance variables are equal to the sum of the multiplication 
outcomes of these weights with the distance (proximity) of each considered variable between 
multiple foreign home countries and each host economy. We construct three distance 
variables that reflect geographic distance (DISGEO) and institutional distance in terms of 
creditor rights (DISCR) and depth of credit information sharing (DISDEPTH). We also 
construct a cultural proximity variable, (PROXCULT), which ranges between 0 and 2. 
Cultural proximity could take maximum value of 2 when there is a colonial link (value of 1) 
and the same official language (value of 1), while 0 otherwise
9
.  
The results of the specifications that include the interaction terms of these distance 
(proximity) variables with foreign bank presence are available in Table 4 (see models 5 to 9). 
We provide estimations from the dynamic panel models as we obtain similar results with the 
fixed effects estimator. The findings lend some support to hypothesis H5. The interaction 
term between cultural proximity (PROXCULT) and foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) enters 
model 6 of Table 4 with a positive and significant at the 10% level coefficient. Thus, the 
positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry strengthens at higher levels of 
cultural proximity between the home countries of foreign banks and the host economy. In 
model 8 of Table 4 we also find that the interaction term between distance in terms of credit 
information sharing (DISDEPTH) and foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level
10
. Thus the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm 
entry weakens at higher levels of institutional distance in terms of information sharing 
between the home countries of foreign banks and a given host economy. This result 
underscores the importance of credit information sharing in reducing the information 
                                                          
9
 We source the data to construct the cultural proximity and geographic distance variables from CEPII. 
www.cepii.fr. Note that the cultural proximity and geographic distance variables we construct are time variant. 
The geographic distance and cultural proximity between two given countries is time invariant but the weights 
that we multiply these characteristics with (i.e. the share of each home country’s foreign bank assets over the 
total foreign bank assets in a given host economy) to construct the distance and proximity variables in this study 
are time variant. 
10
 In unreported estimations we also run model 8 of Table 4 with the inclusion of a distance measure in terms of 
the level of economic development (lnGDPcap) and its interaction with the foreign bank presence variable. Our 
results are robust to this exercise. This is to ensure that the significant and negative effect of the interaction term 
between distance in terms of depth of credit information sharing (DISDEPTH) and foreign bank presence 
(lnFBAST) does not reflect differences between the home and host economies in terms of the level of economic 
development. 
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asymmetries that foreign banks face in a host economy in order to be able to lend to opaque 
borrowers such as aspiring entrepreneurs. Foreign banks that originate from countries with a 
high level of depth of credit information sharing could have developed lending technologies, 
such as credit scoring, in order to extend credit to opaque borrowers that could be highly 
dependent on inputs from credit bureaus or registries. Therefore their capacity to apply such 
lending technologies in a host economy to lend to opaque credit market segments, such as the 
one for entrepreneurial credit, would depend on credit information sharing availability. It is 
also worth noting that in model 9 of Table 4 only the interaction term between distance in 
terms of credit information sharing and foreign bank presence (DISDEPTH*lnFBAST) 
retains its statistical significance
11
. The latter finding highlights the importance of 
institutional in addition to geographic or cultural distance constraints (Mian, 2006) in terms 
of the effect that foreign banks could have on the access to credit for opaque borrowers in the 
host economies. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 IV estimations with alternative foreign bank presence variable and alternative 
dependent variable 
Another way, other than the use of a dynamic panel specification, to overcome the potential 
endogeneity between entrepreneurship and foreign bank presence is to employ an 
instrumental variable (IV) technique such as a two stage least square (2SLS) estimation. To 
this end, we need one or more instrumental variables that satisfy the exclusion restriction; 
that is, we need to identify one or more variables that affect foreign bank presence but do not 
affect entrepreneurship directly. It is evident in the literature (Detragiache et al., 2008; 
Giannetti and Ongena 2009; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012; Delis et al., 2016) that foreign bank 
regulatory restrictions are a valid instrument for foreign bank presence. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the deregulation process in the banking sector exerts a positive effect 
on the expansion of foreign banks (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b). Furthermore, it is 
                                                          
11
 Note that in model 9 of Table 4 we have instrument proliferation because we include all the interaction terms 
of the distance and proximity variables with the foreign bank presence variable in the same specification and we 
have modelled these interactions as endogenous. Since the foreign bank presence variable is endogenous, its 
interaction term with other variables is also endogenous (Asiedu and Lien, 2011) and this is the approach we 
have adopted in this paper. Roodman (2009) suggests that in dynamic panel models the ratio between 
instruments and cross-sections (i.e. countries in our case) should be smaller than unity. Model 9 of Table 4 is the 
only dynamic panel model in this study that the value of this ratio is higher than unity. Therefore, we have 
estimated again model 9 of Table 4 with the difference GMM estimator, which uses a lower number of 
instruments, rather than the system GMM estimator and we obtain qualitatively similar results. These 
estimations are available upon request. 
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unlikely that regulatory restrictions for foreign banks would have a direct effect on 
entrepreneurship.  
Thus, we employ two instrumental variables that reflect foreign bank regulatory restrictions 
in the host economy. The first one, a de jure measure of foreign bank regulatory restrictions, 
is a dummy variable (RESFB) that takes the value of 1 if foreign bank presence is restricted 
and 0 otherwise. To construct this variable we follow an approach similar to Claessens and 
Van Horen (2014b), whereby foreign bank presence is constrained in case foreign bank 
ownership is limited to less than 50% and/or when subsidiaries or branches are not permitted 
to open. The second instrumental variable, a de facto measure of foreign bank regulatory 
restrictions, is the proportion of the applications received from foreign bank entities which 
have been denied by the regulators in the host economy (DENFB). Data for both these 
instrumental variables are obtained from the 2006 and 2011 bank regulation surveys and their 
accompanied papers of Barth et al. (2008, 2013)
12
.  
We provide estimations from 2SLS models with fixed effects and robust standard errors that 
employ the above instruments in Table 5
13
. In these models we employ an alternative foreign 
bank presence variable; the natural logarithm of the percentage ratio of the number of foreign 
banks over the total number of banks in a host economy (lnFBNUM). This variable better 
reflects foreign bank entry in comparison with the asset-based foreign bank presence variable 
(lnFBAST) we used in the main analysis. Furthermore, in models 1 to 4 of Table 5 we use the 
same dependent variable (lnENT) that we have employed in our main analysis. However, in 
models 5 to 8 of Table 5 we employ an alternative dependent variable to proxy for 
entrepreneurship. More specifically, we use country data on nascent entrepreneurship that we 
source from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). In this database, nascent 
entrepreneurship at the country level is measured as the number of people that are actively 
involved in starting a new business, as a percentage of the adult population. This measure of 
entrepreneurship has been employed in several studies of the determinants of new firm entry 
                                                          
12
 We assign the regulatory data following the literature (Houston et al., 2010; Fratzscher et al., 2016). 
Specifically, we assign values from the 2006 survey to the period 2004-2007 and the data employed between 
2008 and 2013 are sourced from the 2011 survey.  
13
 Note that in the models of Table 5 that include interaction terms between the foreign bank presence variable 
(lnFBNUM) and other country characteristics,  following Giannetti and Ongena (2009), we also instrument 
these interaction terms with the interactions between the instrumental variables RESFB and DENFB with the 
corresponding country characteristics. This procedure is important because the interaction between an 
endogenous variable and another variable is also endogenous (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). However, not 
instrumenting for the interaction terms does not yield significant changes in our results. 
 
 
25 
 
(e.g. Wennekers et al., 2005; Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello, 2014)
14
. We employ the natural 
logarithm of this measure (lnNascent).  
Table 5 
The first stage results from the 2SLS IV models in Table 5 indicate that the two instrumental 
variables (RESFB and DENFD) have a negative and significant at the 1% level effect on the 
foreign bank presence variable (see lower part of Table 5) while they do not exert a 
significant direct effect on our entrepreneurship measures (see Table A3 in the appendix). 
Furthermore, in all models of Table 5 the validity of the instruments is demonstrated by the 
under-identification LM test (UIT), the weak identification Wald F-Test (WIT)
15
 and the 
over-identification test of Hansen (OIT).  
The second stage results of the models in Table 5 provide empirical support to our previous 
findings. In most models of Table 5 the alternative foreign bank presence variable 
(lnFBNUM) exerts a positive and significant at the 5% level effect on the two 
entrepreneurship variables (see models 1-8 in Table 5). This lends further support to 
hypothesis H1.B that foreign bank presence would have a positive effect on new firm entry. 
Additionally, in further support of hypothesis H2.B, the interaction term between foreign 
bank presence and creditor rights (lnFBNUM*CR) is negative and exerts significant at the 
5% level effect on the two measures of entrepreneurship we employ (see models 2 and 6 of 
Table 5). Some support of hypothesis H3 that information sharing would strengthen the 
positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry is also evident. The interaction 
term between foreign bank presence (lnFBNUM) and depth of credit information sharing 
(DEPTH) is positive and significant at the 10% level in model 2 of Table 5 when the 
dependent variable is the World Bank measure of entrepreneurship (lnENT). However, it is 
positive and not significantly different from zero when the dependent variable is the nascent 
entrepreneurship (lnNascent) measure from GEM (see model 6 of Table 5). We also find 
further evidence that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on entrepreneurship 
weakens in the presence of public credit registries. In model 3 and model 7 of Table 5 the 
interaction term between foreign bank presence and the public credit registry dummy 
(lnFBNUM*PBDUM) is negative and significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. The 
latter finding lends additional support to hypothesis H4 that private credit bureaus would be 
more beneficial than public credit registries in terms of the effect of foreign bank presence on 
                                                          
14
 The GEM database has less coverage in terms of countries in comparison with the World Bank 
Entrepreneurship Database. 
15
 We obtain critical values for the WIT from Stock and Yogo (2005). 
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new firm entry. Finally, we find some further evidence that the distance in terms of depth of 
credit information sharing between the home and host economy (DISDEPTH) weakens the 
positive effect of foreign bank presence (lnFBNUM) on new firm entry. The interaction term 
lnFBNUM*DISDEPTH is negative and significant at the 5% level in model 4 of Table 5 but 
negative and not significant in model 8 of Table 5 when we use the alternative measure of 
entrepreneurship (lnNascent) as the dependent variable. The latter finding lends some weak 
support to hypothesis H5 that distance effects would moderate the positive effect of foreign 
bank presence on new firm entry
16
. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Panel VAR estimations 
As a final robustness check, we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) and opt for the flexible 
framework of a panel VAR specification that includes the new firm entry rate variable 
(lnENT) and the foreign bank presence variable (lnFBAST). In a panel VAR framework, all 
variables are assumed to be endogenous and in this way we can take into account reverse 
causality issues. Furthermore, the panel VAR analysis allows us to observe the isolated 
impact of foreign bank presence on new firm entry rate as well as its intertemporal effects. 
Specifically, we focus on orthogonalized impulse-response functions (IRFs), which show the 
response of the variable of interest (new firm entry) to an orthogonal shock in another 
variable of interest (foreign bank presence)
17
. By orthogonalizing the response we are able to 
identify the effect of one shock at a time, while holding other shocks constant. We present the 
IRFs results in graphical form in Figure 1. The second graph of the first row shows the 
response of new firm entry (lnENT) on a one standard deviation shock of the foreign bank 
presence variable (lnFBAST). The middle line is the impulse response, and the two lines 
above and below are the 95% and 5% confidence intervals, respectively, obtained from 
Monte Carlo simulation (we use 500 replications). 
Figure 1 and Table 6 
                                                          
16
 We have also estimated 2SLS IV models that include the interaction terms between foreign banks presence 
and the other distance (proximity) variables (geographic distance, cultural proximity and creditor rights 
distance) but we did not find statistically significant effects. 
17
 As a first step in the panel VAR estimation we follow Lütkepohl (2006) and assume the optimal order of lags 
for the right-hand side variables of the system of equations. We compute for the first, second and third lag the 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. We confirm with the results of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
with the results of the Arellano-Bond AR tests that the optimal lag is of order one. Furthermore, because we 
cannot have time effects, variables are time-demeaned to remove unwanted trends. 
 
 
 
27 
 
In line with hypothesis H1.B, we observe that new firm entry (lnENT) responds positively 
and significantly (at the 5% level) to a foreign bank presence (lnFBAST) shock. Furthermore, 
this is a long-lasting effect implying that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new 
firm entry rate persists over time. Box 1 in Table 6 presents further evidence of the 
importance of foreign bank presence for new firm entry as reported by the variance 
decompositions (VDCs) estimations. Specifically, around 13.67% of the forecast error 
variance of new firm entry (lnENT) after 10 years is explained by foreign bank presence 
(lnFBAST) disturbances. We obtain similar results (See Box 2 in Table 6 and Figure 2) from 
the panel VAR specification when we employ the alternative entrepreneurship variable 
(lnNascent). 
Figure 2 
5. Conclusion 
This study finds that foreign bank presence exerts a positive and significant effect on new 
firm entry. Furthermore, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
subdues at higher levels of creditor rights but strengthens at higher levels of information 
sharing. The former result indicates, from an entrepreneurship standpoint, that foreign bank 
presence could substitute for weak legal structures in the host economies. The latter finding 
provides evidence that foreign banks could particularly benefit entrepreneurship when a host 
economy has in place a strong information sharing infrastructure. This could enable foreign 
banks to reduce the information asymmetries they face in the host economy by enabling the 
use of their advanced lending technologies such as credit scoring.  
In further analysis, we provide evidence that the information sharing provider matters. More 
specifically, we find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry 
strengthens in the presence of a private credit bureau but subdues in the presence of public 
credit registry. Private credit bureaus, by providing rich information on the credit history of a 
wide range of potential borrowers, as for example small borrowers, and the provision of 
additional services such as credit scoring, reduce the information asymmetry between foreign 
banks and the opaque entrepreneurship credit market segment and thus facilitate foreign bank 
lending to entrepreneurial efforts. Finally, we also provide some evidence that distance 
between the home and host economies in terms of information sharing and culture weakens 
the positive effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry. 
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These empirical findings have some important policy implications. Governments, especially 
in countries with weak legal structure, could try to attract foreign bank investment in order to 
enhance the entrepreneurship rates in their economies. Furthermore, governments in countries 
where already foreign bank presence is high could focus on improving the information 
sharing infrastructure of their banking system, especially through private credit bureaus, in 
order to facilitate foreign bank lending to entrepreneurs.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Description of the variables 
Notation Measure Data Source 
A. Main Dependent Variable 
Firm Entry Density 
(ENT) 
 The number of newly registered companies per 1,000 working-age 
people (ages 15–64) per year 
World Bank  
Entrepreneurship 
Database 
B. Main Explanatory Variables 
Foreign Ownership of 
Banks in terms of assets 
(FBAST) 
The percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets in a 
country. 
Claessens and Van 
Horen (2014a), 
Claessens and Van 
Horen (2015) 
Creditor Rights (CR) 
An index that measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate 
lending. (0-10 scale) 
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
Depth of Credit 
Information (DEPTH) 
A measure of rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and 
accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit 
registry or a private credit bureau. The index has a 0-6 scale and a country 
gets one point in the depth of information sharing index for each the 
following features: i) Both positive and negative information are 
distributed, ii) data are available for both firms and individuals, iii) more 
than two years of historical data are distributed, iv) data on large as well 
as small loans are distributed, v) data from financial institutions as well as 
retailers and utility companies are distributed and vi) by law, borrowers 
have the right to access their data in the largest registry or bureau  
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
GDP growth The annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
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Bank 
GDP per capita 
(GDPcap) 
The gross domestic product per capita in real purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Private sector credit 
(PSC) The domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Agriculture value added  
(AGRIC) Value added from agriculture as % of GDP 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Bank industry 
concentration ratio (C3) 
Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial 
banking assets 
Global Financial 
Development 
Database, World 
Bank 
Financial Freedom 
(FINFREE) 
A country's independence from government control and interference in 
the financial sector, including banks. It considers government ownership 
of financial firms, extent of financial and capital market development, 
government influence on the allocation of credit and openness to foreign 
competition. (0-100 scale) 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Business Freedom 
(BUSFREE) 
A measure of how easy it is to establish and run an enterprise without 
undue interference from the state. (0-100 scale) 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Fiscal Freedom 
(FISCFREE) 
A measure of the extent to which government permits individuals and 
businesses to keep and manage their income and wealth for their own 
benefit and use. (0-100 scale) 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Government Freedom 
(GOVFREE) 
A measure of how free is an economy from governments' expenditures as 
a percentage of GDP, including consumption and transfers. (0-100 scale) 
Heritage 
Foundation 
FDI inflows (INFDI) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Regulatory Quality 
(REGWB) 
A measure of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
World Governance 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
C. Variables used in further analysis and robustness checks 
Rule of law (RLWB) 
A measure of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts. (2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
World Governance 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Private credit bureau 
dummy (PVDUM) 
A dummy that takes a value of zero if the percentage of individuals and 
firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on their 
borrowing history is zero and takes the value of 1 otherwise. 
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
Public credit registry 
dummy (PBDUM) 
A dummy that takes a value of zero if the percentage of individuals and 
firms listed in a public credit registry with information on their borrowing 
history is zero and takes the value of 1 otherwise. 
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
DISGEO 
The weighted geographic distance in km between the capital of the home 
countries of foreign banks with the capital of each host economy CEPII 
PROXCULT 
The weighted cultural proximity between the home countries of foreign 
banks with each host economy. Cultural proximity is measured in terms 
of common official language and colonial tie. Therefore it can take a 
value of 2, 1 or 0. CEPII 
DISCR 
The weighted difference in terms of creditor rights between the home 
countries of foreign banks with each host economy. 
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
DISEPTH 
The weighted difference in terms of credit information sharing between 
the home countries of foreign banks with each host economy. 
Doing Business, 
World Bank 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship rate 
(NASCENT) 
The number of people that are actively involved in starting a new 
business, as a percentage of adult population 
Global 
Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) 
Foreign ownership of 
Banks in terms of 
numbers (FBNUM) 
The percentage of the number of foreign banks among the total number of 
banks in a country 
Claessens and Van 
Horen (2014a, 
2015) 
D. Instrumental Variables 
RESFB 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 of foreign bank presence in a 
country faces regulatory restrictions and 0 otherwise. Foreign bank 
presence is restricted when foreign bank ownership is limited to less than 
50% and/or when foreign branches or subsidiaries are not permitted to 
Barth et al. 
(2008,2013) 
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open. 
DENFB 
The proportion of foreign bank applications that have been declined by 
the regulatory authorities of each country as a % of total foreign bank 
applications. 
Barth et al.  
(2008, 2013)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm Entry Density (ENT) 691 3.337 4.139 0 32.6 
Foreign Ownership of Banks in 
terms of assets (FBAST) 673 44.521 33.815 1 100 
Foreign Ownership of Banks in 
terms of numbers (FBNUM) 682 44.698 26.722 1 100 
Creditor Rights (CR) 691 5.999 2.414 0 10 
Depth of Credit Information 
(DEPTH) 691 3.318 2.321 0 6 
GDP per capita (GDPcap) 682 21,586 18,242 575 96,711 
GDP growth 691 3.479 4.139 -14.814 17.291 
Private sector credit (PSC) 632 68.559 52.567 0.010 227.527 
Agriculture value added as% of GDP 
(AGRIC) 679 9.439 9.549 0.034 43.206 
Bank industry concentration ratio 
(C3) 661 71.495 19.830 21.695 100 
Financial Freedom (FINFREE) 676 59.201 18.150 10 90 
Business Freedom (BUSFREE) 676 72.532 14.303 28.8 100 
Fiscal Freedom (FISCFREE) 676 73.899 13.744 32.7 99.9 
Government Freedom (GOVFREE) 674 61.089 22.869 2.2 96.1 
Regulatory Quality (REGWB) 682 0.491 0.857 -1.638 1.971 
FDI inflows (INFDI) 682 5.863 9.988 -58.978 142.257 
Rule of law (RLWB) 682 0.337 0.974 -1.653 2.000 
Public credit registry dummy 
(PBDUM) 691 0.499 0.500 0 1 
Private credit bureau dummy 
(PVDUM) 691 0.654 0.476 0 1 
Nascent entrepreneurship rate 
(NASCENT) 392 5.838 4.647 0.89 31.3 
Distance in terms of creditor rights 
(DISCR) 663 1.145 3.095 -10 8.3 
Distance in terms of information 
sharing (DISEPTH) 663 -0.409 2.421 -6 6 
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Proximity in terms of culture 
(PROXCULT) 669 0.404 0.529 0 2 
Geographic distance in ln  
(DISGEO) 670 8.193 1.007 5.683 9.721 
Foreign bank regulatory restrictions 
(RESFB) 619 0.168 0.374 0 1 
Foreign bank denied applications 
ratio (DENFB) 623 0.050 0.155 0 1 
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Table 3. The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry (2005-2013) and the conditioning effects of creditor rights and depth of credit information sharing 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of new firm entry density (lnENT) sourced from the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database. lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of foreign bank assets over total bank assets, CR is creditor 
rights, DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing, lnGDPcap is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP terms, PSC is private sector credit to GDP, AGRIC is agriculture value added as % of GDP, FINFREE is financial freedom, 
BUSFREE is business freedom, FISCFREE is fiscal freedom, GOVFREE is freedom from government spending, C3 is the three largest banks concentration ratio of the banking industry of a country, REGWB is regulatory quality, INFDI is net 
FDI inflows as % of GDP, RLWB is rule of law. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
       (1)      (2)       (3)     (4)      (5)      (6)      (7)      (8)       (9)     (10) 
VARIABLES Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM Fixed-Effects System-GMM 
L.lnENT 
   
0.897*** 0.942*** 0.900***        0.932*** 0.942*** 
     
(0.0270) (0.0175) (0.0172)         (0.0132) (0.0256) 
lnFBAST 0.261** 0.602*** 0.2668** 0.571** 0.0843** 0.284*** 0.0893** 0.171*** 0.399*** 0.0422* 
 
(0.120) (0.222) (0.116) (0.253) (0.0360) (0.0931) (0.0397) (0.0374) (0.141) (0.0219) 
CR 0.0606 0.426** 0.0600 0.425** 0.0251* 0.133** 0.0203 0.100*** 0.425** 0.0717 
 
(0.0456) (0.179) (0.0462) (0.181) (0.0127) (0.0591) (0.0152) (0.0257) (0.178) (0.0536) 
DEPTH 0.00409 0.00310 0.0389 0.0287 0.0189 0.0104 0.0543* 0.0424 0.00278 0.0243 
 
(0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0783) (0.0780) (0.0140) (0.00679) (0.0294) (0.0303) (0.0136) (0.01762) 
GDPgr 0.00800** 0.00763** 0.00794** 0.00758** 0.0250*** 0.0261*** 0.0252*** 0.0234*** 0.00764** 0.0264*** 
 
(0.00324) (0.00312) (0.00323) (0.00311) (0.00265) (0.00179) (0.00199) (0.00166) (0.00310) (0.00175) 
lnGDPcap 1.314*** 1.380*** 1.311*** 1.377*** 0.120** 0.0985* 0.0712** 0.0847** 1.379*** 0.0810 
 
(0.251) (0.241) (0.255) (0.245) (0.0486) (0.0517) (0.0372) (0.0366) (0.240) (0.0624) 
PSC 0.00359 0.00486 0.00367 0.00493 0.00185 0.00203 0.00248 0.00304 0.00484 0.00218 
 
(0.00421) (0.00434) (0.00419) (0.00431) (0.00230) (0.00138) (0.00213) (0.00206) (0.00432) (0.00155) 
AGRIC -0.00184 -0.00635 -0.00229 -0.00675 -0.0234 -0.0214 -0.0158 -0.0181 -0.00627 -0.0249 
 
(0.0133) (0.0120) (0.0136) (0.0121) (0.0482) (0.0311) (0.0215) (0.0190) (0.0122) (0.0338) 
FINFREE 0.00366 0.00456* 0.00351 0.00442 0.00468 0.00324 0.00351 0.00202 0.00253 0.00192 
 
(0.00254) (0.00266) (0.00256) (0.00269) (0.00338) (0.00286) (0.00227) (0.00129) (0.00265) (0.00216) 
BUSFREE 0.00661** 0.00696*** 0.00665** 0.00699*** 0.00855*** 0.00573*** 0.00713*** 0.00424*** 0.00696*** 0.00654*** 
 
(0.00265) (0.00261) (0.00262) (0.00258) (0.00207) (0.00147) (0.00146) (0.000911) (0.00262) (0.00163) 
FISCFREE 0.0117 0.00725 0.0118 0.00732 0.000920 0.00171 0.00129 0.00155 0.00722 7.67e-05 
 
(0.00787) (0.00667) (0.00790) (0.00671) (0.00189) (0.00170) (0.00130) (0.00114) (0.00667) (0.00162) 
GOVFREE 0.00420** 0.00490** 0.00415** 0.00485** 0.00254 0.00243** 0.00218* 0.00176** 0.00490** 0.00175 
 
(0.00209) (0.00214) (0.00207) (0.00214) (0.00158) (0.00103) (0.00115) (0.000840) (0.00215) (0.00117) 
CR -0.000167 -3.88e-05 -8.00e-05 -4.05e-05 -0.00316 -0.00302* -0.00234 -0.00293* -4.34e-05 -0.00265 
 
(0.00182) (0.00172) (0.00187) (0.00177) (0.00199) (0.00157) (0.00174) (0.00158) (0.00172) (0.00173) 
REGWB 0.0726 0.0699 0.0698 0.0673 0.118 0.0343 0.0745 0.0675 0.0619 0.0712 
 
(0.153) (0.141) (0.155) (0.142) (0.0845) (0.0534) (0.0545) (0.0443) (0.124) (0.0941) 
INFDI 7.12e-05 4.86e-05 6.92e-05 4.68e-05 0.00300 0.00252 0.000944 0.00138 5.26e-05 0.00162 
 
(0.000818) (0.000807) (0.000806) (0.000797) (0.00230) (0.00217) (0.00117) (0.00147) (0.000807) (0.00112) 
RLWB                                                       0.2318 0.154*  
                                                       (0.222) (0.0834)  
lnFBAST*CR 
 
        -0.0965**         -0.0963**        -0.0343*** -0.0260*** 
 
  
        (0.0401)          (0.0405)        (0.0124) (0.00620) 
 lnFBAST*DEPTH 
  
0.00909         0.00829 
 
0.0138 0.0167** 
  
   
(0.0218)         (0.0212) 
 
(0.0098) (0.0075) 
 lnFBAST*RLWB 
        
-0.1955* -0.0387*** 
         
(0.1143) (0.0141) 
Constant -13.59*** -15.68*** -13.44*** -15.54*** -1.772*** -1.959*** -1.175*** -1.551*** -15.67*** -0.796* 
 
(2.535) (2.621) (2.683) (2.783) (0.606) (0.742) (0.419) (0.374) (2.583) (0.452) 
Observations 632 632 632 632 617 617 617 617 632 617 
R-squared 0.297 0.319 0.298 0.319 
    
0.319 
 F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
AR2 p-value     0.528 0.496 0.573 0.539  0.609 
Hansen J p-value     0.336 0.082 0.512 0.417  0.120 
Instruments     57 67 67 81  67 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
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Table 4. The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry (2005-2013): the conditioning effects of different types of information sharing providers and of distance 
constraints 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM System-GMM 
L.lnENT 0.922*** 0.908*** 0.903***  0.914*** 0.933*** 0.901*** 0.910*** 0.899*** 0.905*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0305) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0271) (0.0172) (0.0338) (0.0333) (0.0251) 
lnFBAST 0.0462 0.245** 0.150* 0.0638 0.112** 0.0875** 0.0864** 0.154** 0.123* 
 (0.0680) (0.104) (0.0818) (0.0565) (0.0512) (0.0433) (0.0430) (0.0669) (0.0713) 
CR 0.0196 0.0243* 0.0175 0.0225 0.0232* 0.0161 0.0203 0.0171 0.0177 
 (0.0155) (0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0230) (0.0118) (0.0107) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0136) 
DEPTH 0.00490 0.00350 0.00467  0.00348 0.00345 0.00361 0.00446 0.00311 
 (0.0132) (0.00873) (0.00724)  (0.00833) (0.00668) (0.00413) (0.00302) (0.00539) 
GDPgr 0.0236*** 0.0251*** 0.0237*** 0.0230*** 0.0194*** 0.0226*** 0.0254*** 0.0223*** 0.0236*** 
 (0.00211) (0.00227) (0.00152) (0.00101) (0.00118) (0.00173) (0.00176) (0.00212) (0.00191) 
lnGDPcap 0.1268* 0.1612** 0.1414** 0.0608*** 0.0785** 0.0718** 0.126** 0.0767* 0.0721* 
 (0.0699) (0.0717) (0.0594) (0.0147) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0550) (0.0448) (0.0419) 
PSC 0.00434 0.00461 0.00442 0.00416 0.00417 0.00398 0.00299 0.00226 0.00188 
 (0.00354) (0.00346) (0.00383) (0.00352) (0.00350) (0.00292) (0.00227) (0.00183) (0.00262) 
AGRIC -0.0716 -0.0820 -0.0748 -0.0643 -0.0734 -0.0681 -0.0755 -0.0601 -0.0714 
 (0.0660) (0.0531) (0.0507) (0.0482) (0.0512) (0.0562) (0.0583) (0.0476) (0.0520) 
FINFREE 0.00318 0.00405 0.00424 0.00385 -0.00216 0.00126 -0.00166 0.000882 0.00200 
 (0.00212) (0.00287) (0.00294) (0.00237) (0.00145) (0.00100) (0.00205) (0.00168) (0.00205) 
BUSFREE 0.00628*** 0.00637*** 0.00723*** 0.00641*** 0.00617*** 0.00714*** 0.00668*** 0.00735*** 0.00539*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00179) (0.00153) (0.00178) (0.00123) (0.00113) (0.00206) (0.00219) (0.00120) 
FISCFREE 0.00389* 0.00139 -0.000838 -0.000541 -0.000538 0.00193 0.00348 0.00283 0.00360 
 (0.00233) (0.00201) (0.00140) (0.00081) (0.00177) (0.00130) (0.00288) (0.00281) (0.00267) 
GOVFREE 0.00303** 0.000338 0.00116* 0.000254 0.00210* 0.000632 0.00272** 5.75e-05  0.00252** 
 (0.00132) (0.000749) (0.000649) (0.000572) (0.00110) (0.000916) (0.00119) (0.00106) (0.00117) 
C3 -0.00225 -0.00327** -0.00201** -0.00156 -00204** -0.00161* -0.00120 -0.00156 -0.000128 
 (0.00150) (0.00133) (0.000999) (0.00135) (0.000872) (0.000881) (0.000815) (0.00104) (0.000869) 
REGWB 0.117** 0.0593 0.0804* 0.0731 -0.0202 8.81e-05 0.128** 0.136** 0.0775 
 (0.0505) (0.0417) (0.0426) (0.0487) (0.0470) (0.0358) (0.0632) (0.0568) (0.0589) 
INFDI -0.000689 0.00161 -0.000388 -0.000656 0.00149 -0.000745 0.00165 0.00188 -0.000115 
 (0.00117) (0.00160) (0.00123) (0.00115) (0.00182) (0.00119) (0.00200) (0.00172) (0.00140) 
PBDUM     -0.325 -0.141** -0.263 -0.234      
     (0.218) (0.0679) (0.185) (0.158)      
PVDUM 0.212*** 0.653* 0.270* 0.345**      
 (0.0527) (0.344) (0.153) (0.149)      
DISGEO     -0.146    -0.0635 
     (0.0910)    (0.147) 
PROXCULT      0.0654   0.171 
      (0.183)   (0.280) 
DISCR       -0.0559  -0.0568 
       (0.0434)  (0.0438) 
DISDEPTH        0.118 0.135 
        (0.0726) (0.0923) 
lnFBAST*PVDUM 0.117**  0.0475 0.0746*      
 (0.0518)  (0.0602) (0.0394)      
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Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of new firm entry density (lnENT) sourced from the World Bank Entrepreneurship Database. lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of foreign bank 
assets over total bank assets, CR is creditor rights, DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing, lnGDPcap is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP terms, PSC is private sector credit to GDP, 
AGRIC is agriculture value added as % of GDP, FINFREE is financial freedom, BUSFREE is business freedom, FISCFREE is fiscal freedom, GOVFREE is freedom from government spending, C3 is 
the three largest banks concentration ratio of the banking industry of a country, REGWB is regulatory quality, INFDI is net FDI inflows as % of GDP, PVDUM is the private credit bureau dummy, 
PBDUM is the public credit registry dummy, DISGEO is geographic distance, PROXCULT is cultural proximity, DISCR is creditor rights distance, DISDEPTH is depth of credit information sharing 
distance. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
lnFBAST*PBDUM  -0.142** -0.0978** -0.0841**      
  (0.0672) (0.0458) (0.0356)      
lnFBAST*DISGEO     -0.0338    -0.0172 
     (0.0262)    (0.0359) 
lnFBAST*PROXCULT      0.0292*   0.0226 
      (0.0165)   (0.0192) 
lnFBAST*DISCR       -0.0176  -0.0202 
       (0.0122)  (0.0144) 
lnFBAST*DISDEPTH        -0.0497*** -0.0393*** 
        (0.0124) (0.0108) 
Constant -1.530*** -1.465*** -1.599*** -1.434*** -1.584*** -1.492*** -2.014*** -1.805*** -1.622*** 
 (0.514) (0.521) (0.491) (0.422) (0.448) (0.511) (0.615) (0.526) (0.429) 
F-test p-value 
AR2 p-value 
Hansen J p-value 
0.000 
0.458 
0.282 
0.000 
0.316 
0.444 
0.000 
0.390 
0.409 
0.000 
0.729 
0.620 
0.000 
0.776 
0.488 
0.000 
0.795 
0.258 
0.000 
0.893 
0.430 
0.000 
0.882 
0.519 
0.000 
0.722 
0.874 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 
Instruments 
617 
67 
617 
67 
617 
81 
617 
81 
617 
71 
617 
71 
617 
67 
617 
67 
617 
117 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
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Table 5. The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry (2005-2013): 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) 
estimations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
         
lnFBNUM 0.278** 0.605** 0.459** 0.213* 0.109** 0.159** 0.147** 0.134** 
 (0.121) (0.242) (0.200) (0.119) (0.0529) (0.0689) (0.0710) (0.0637) 
CR 0.0428 0.276*** 0.0475* 0.0462* 0.0841* 0.0939**  0.0854*  0.101** 
 (0.0261) (0.101) (0.0261) (0.0264) (0.0452) (0.0437) (0.0444) (0.0453) 
DEPTH 0.00489 0.0183 0.0110 0.00281 0.0917*** 0.0825 0.0958* 0.0943*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0125) (0.0338) (0.221) (0.0504) (0.0342) 
GDPgr 0.00918*** 0.00895*** 0.00869*** 0.00929*** 0.00896** 0.00725* 0.00760* 0.00678** 
 (0.00289) (0.00289) (0.00300) (0.00298) (0.00407) (0.00404) (0.00388) (0.00329) 
lnGDPcap 1.267*** 1.361*** 1.390*** 1.291*** 0.638 0.737 0.566 0.633 
 (0.185) (0.198) (0.194) (0.192) (0.501) (0.490) (0.479) (0.508) 
PSC 0.00337 0.00420* 0.00340 0.00354 0.00659* 0.00560 0.00638 0.00679** 
 (0.00239) (0.00247) (0.00234) (0.00247) (0.00341) (0.00377) (0.00431) (0.00341) 
AGRIC -0.00201* -0.0168 -0.0211* -0.0158 -0.0166 -0.0164 -0.0318 -0.0139 
 (0.00118) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0348) (0.0344) (0.0419) (0.0374) 
FINFREE 0.00371*  0.00340  0.00377* 0.00324 0.000646 -0.000420 0.000659 0.00184 
 (0.00205) (0.00223) (0.00196) (0.00212) (0.00377) (0.00417) (0.00376) (0.00430) 
BUSFREE 0.00667*** 0.00680*** 0.00662** 0.00711** 0.0201***  0.0204*** 0.0207***   0.0205*** 
 (0.00255) (0.00255) (0.00258) (0.00282) (0.00517) (0.00564) (0.00522) (0.00697) 
FISCFR 0.00719 0.00470 0.00649 0.00678 0.001981** 0.002043** 0.001955** 0.001833** 
 (0.00503) (0.00509) (0.00467) (0.00545) (0.00093) (0.0096) (0.00097) (0.00091) 
GOVFR 0.00356** 0.00400** 0.00383** 0.00379** 0.00164 0.00165 0.00134 0.00193 
 (0.00160) (0.00162) (0.00163) (0.00161) (0.00382) (0.00383) (0.00394) (0.00407) 
C3 -0.000284 -0.000126 -0.000780 -0.000231 0.000471 0.000439 0.000810 0.000873 
 (0.00147) (0.00145) (0.00150) (0.00147) (0.00270) (0.00270) (0.00266) (0.00284) 
REGWB 0.0565 0.0511 0.0515 0.113 0.194 0.285 0.0539 0.0604 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.123) (0.123) (0.264) (0.254) (0.264) (0.287) 
INFDI 0.000172 0.000195 0.000354 0.000237 -0.00274 -0.00295 -0.00281 -0.00297 
 (0.000703) (0.000716) (0.000703) (0.000709) (0.00187) (0.00190) (0.00184) (0.00190) 
DISDEPTH    0.0853    0.0504 
    (0.0751)    (0.0939) 
PVDUM   1.130**    0.709  
   (0.443)    (1.704)  
PBDUM   -0.984    -0.563  
   (0.841)    (0.448)  
lnFBNUM*CR  -0.0622**    -0.0393**   
  (0.0249)    (0.0176)   
lnFBNUM*DEPTH  0.0210*    0.00386   
  (0.0118)    (0.0595)   
lnFBNUM*PVDUM       0.180    0.319  
   (0.214)         (0.390)  
lnFBNUM*PBDUM   -0.330***    -0.231**  
   (0.117)    (0.105)  
         
lnFBNUM*DISDEPTH    -0.0283**    -0.0185 
    (0.0186)    (0.0126) 
 
First Stage  
 
RESFB 
 
DENFB 
 
 
 
 
-0.0707*** 
(0.02191) 
-0.1955*** 
(0.0590) 
 
 
 
-0.0342*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0957*** 
(0.0303) 
 
 
 
-0.0385*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.1031*** 
(0.0381) 
 
 
 
-0.0567*** 
(0.0165) 
-01706*** 
(0.0541) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0975*** 
(0.0305) 
-0.2975*** 
(0.1002) 
 
 
 
-0.0419*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.1832*** 
(0.0573) 
 
 
 
-0.0392*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.1743*** 
(0.0488) 
 
 
 
-0.0948*** 
(0.0287) 
-0.2893*** 
(0.0924) 
Observations 582 582 582 582 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.317 0.325 0.343 0.336 0.151 0.158 0.167 0.157 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Countries 
F-test p-value 
UIT p-value 
WIT with 
critical value 
OIT p-value 
76 
0.000 
0.000 
83.375 
19.930 
0.8090 
76 
0.000 
0.000 
34.442 
12.200 
0.5016 
76 
0.000 
0.000 
24.137 
12.200 
0.3871 
76 
0.000 
0.000 
35.024 
11.040 
0.4320 
44 
0.000 
0.000 
36.996 
19.930 
0.4595 
44 
0.000 
0.000 
15.838 
12.200 
0.8988 
44 
0.000 
0.000 
14.653 
12.200 
0.4644 
44 
0.000 
0.000 
19.661 
11.040 
0.7367 
Note: The dependent variable for models 1-4 is the natural logarithm of new firm entry density (lnENT) sourced from the World Bank 
Entrepreneurship Database. The dependent variable for models 5-8 is the natural logarithm of nascent entrepreneurship (lnNascent) sourced from 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM).lnFBNUM is the natural logarithm of the number of foreign banks over the total number of banks, 
CR is creditor rights, DEPTH is depth of credit information sharing, lnGDPcap is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP terms, PSC is 
private sector credit to GDP, AGRIC is agriculture value added as % of GDP, FINFREE is financial freedom, BUSFREE is business freedom, 
FISCFREE is fiscal freedom, GOVFREE is freedom from government spending, C3 is the three largest banks concentration ratio of the banking 
industry of a country, REGWB is regulatory quality, INFDI is net FDI inflows as % of GDP, PVDUM is the private credit bureau dummy, 
PBDUM is the public credit registry dummy, DISDEPTH is depth of credit information sharing distance. UIT is the under-identification LM test 
by Kleibergen and Paap, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. WIT is the Wald F-statistic of the 
weak identification test by Kleibergen and Paap, which must be higher than its critical value to reject the null hypothesis. OIT is the over-
identification test of Hansen, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6: The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry and nascent entrepreneurship 
– Variance Decompositions (VDCs) from Panel VAR estimation 
Box 1 Box 2 
Variables s lnENT lnFBAST Variables s lnNascent lnFBAST 
lnENT 10 0.8633 0.1367 lnNascent 10 0.7045 0.2955 
lnFBAST 10 0.0159 0.9841 lnFBAST 10 0.0029 0.9971 
lnENT 20 0.8524 0.1476 lnNascent 20 0.7041 0.2959 
lnFBAST 20 0.0176 0.9824 lnFBAST 20 0.0029 0.9971 
lnENT 30 0.8518 0.1482 lnNascent 30 0.7041 0.2959 
lnFBAST 30 0.0177 0.9823 lnFBAST 30 0.0029 0.9971 
Note: lnENT stands for the natural logarithm of new firm entry density, lnNascent is the 
natural logarithm of nascent entrepreneurship, lnFBAST is the natural logarithm of 
foreign bank assets over total bank assets. s denotes periods ahead. 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry –Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs) from Panel VAR estimation 
 
 
Note: lnENT stands for the natural logarithm of new entry density and lnFBAST is the natural logarithm 
of foreign bank assets over total bank assets 
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Figure 2. The effect of foreign bank presence on new firm entry –Impulse Response 
Functions (IRFs) from Panel VAR estimation with alternative measure of entrepreneurship 
 
 
Note: lnNascent stands for the natural logarithm of nascent entrepreneurship and lnFBAST is the natural 
logarithm of foreign bank assets over total bank assets. 
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Appendices: 
A1. 
Table A1. Countries included in the analysis 
Albania Denmark Korea, Rep. Portugal Uruguay 
Algeria Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Romania Uzbekistan 
Armenia El Salvador Latvia Rwanda Zambia 
Australia Estonia Lithuania Senegal 
 Austria Finland Luxembourg Serbia 
 Azerbaijan France Macedonia, FYR Singapore 
 
Belarus Georgia Mauritius Slovak Republic 
 Belgium Germany Moldova Slovenia 
 Bolivia Ghana Mongolia South Africa 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Montenegro Spain 
 Botswana Guatemala Morocco Sweden 
 Bulgaria Hong Kong, China Namibia Switzerland 
 Burkina Faso Hungary Nepal Thailand 
 Canada Ireland Netherlands Togo 
 Chile Israel New Zealand Tunisia 
 Colombia Italy Niger Turkey 
 Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Norway Uganda 
 Costa Rica Jordan Peru Ukraine 
 Croatia Kazakhstan Philippines UAE 
 Czech Republic Kenya Poland United Kingdom   
Note: The selection of countries reflects the availability of the dependent and the explanatory variables of 
the analysis. 
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A2. 
Table A2. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
Note: lnFBAST is the ln of foreign bank assets over total bank assets, lnFBNUM is the ln of the number of foreign banks over the total number of banks, CR is creditor rights, DEPTH is depth 
of credit information sharing, lnGDPcap is the ln of GDP per capita in PPP terms, PSC is private sector credit to GDP, AGRIC is agriculture value added as % of GDP, FINFREE is financial 
freedom, BUSFREE is business freedom, FISCFREE is fiscal freedom, GOVFREE is freedom from government spending, C3 is the three largest banks concentration ratio of the banking 
industry of a country, REGWB is regulatory quality, INFDI is net FDI inflows, PBDUM is a dummy for the presence of a public credit registry, PVDUM is a dummy for the presence of a 
private credit bureau,  DISCR is distance in terms of creditor rights, DISDEPTH is distance in terms of depth of credit information sharing, PROXCULT is cultural proximity, DISGEO is 
geographic distance.
lnFBAST lnFBNUM CR DEPTH GDPgr lnGDPcap PSC AGRIC C3 FINFREE BUSFREE FISCFREE GOVFREE REGWB INFDI PBDUM PVDUM DISCR DISDEPTH PROXCULT DISGEO
lnFBAST 1
lnFBNUM 0.828 1
CR 0.236 0.116 1
DEPTH -0.139 -0.129 0.126 1
GDPgr -0.013 0.064 -0.121 -0.259 1
lnGDPcap -0.200 -0.185 0.248 0.527 -0.340 1
PSC -0.019 -0.031 -0.197 0.314 -0.125 0.120 1
AGRIC 0.096 0.098 -0.145 -0.486 0.333 -0.885 -0.162 1
C3 0.210 0.187 0.081 -0.082 0.007 -0.068 -0.137 0.038 1
FINFREE 0.183 0.121 0.455 0.387 -0.237 0.554 -0.051 -0.488 0.069 1
BUSFREE -0.001 -0.091 0.419 0.428 -0.307 0.672 0.037 -0.582 0.164 0.568 1
FISCFREE 0.197 0.458 -0.022 -0.132 0.259 -0.320 -0.022 0.301 0.099 -0.257 -0.312 1
GOVFREE -0.012 0.224 -0.150 -0.189 0.336 -0.521 -0.115 0.475 0.136 -0.337 -0.378 0.60 1
REGWB -0.027 -0.113 0.461 0.457 -0.346 0.803 0.021 -0.684 0.024 0.782 0.732 -0.458 -0.502 1
INFDI 0.081 0.156 0.081 -0.039 0.040 0.194 -0.003 -0.145 0.073 0.214 0.118 -0.036 -0.105 0.194 1
PBDUM 0.022 0.041 -0.429 0.066 0.021 -0.067 0.534 0.047 -0.190 -0.262 -0.225 0.140 0.038 -0.193 -0.101 1
PVDUM -0.153 -0.165 0.208 0.701 -0.177 0.372 -0.054 -0.321 -0.023 0.330 0.309 -0.112 -0.067 0.398 -0.088 -0.229 1
DISCR -0.094 -0.066 0.061 -0.049 0.045 -0.003 -0.027 0.077 0.050 -0.036 -0.009 -0.076 -0.060 0.046 -0.030 0.128 -0.114 1
DISDEPTH 0.097 0.029 0.100 0.048 0.038 -0.085 0.062 0.053 0.048 0.075 -0.041 -0.046 -0.056 0.023 0.065 0.133 0.009 0.358 1
PROXCULT 0.059 0.150 0.014 -0.057 0.094 -0.015 -0.117 -0.019 0.042 0.125 0.058 0.123 0.024 0.025 0.105 -0.169 0.000 -0.250 -0.092 1
DISGEO -0.135 0.054 -0.126 -0.041 0.189 -0.266 0.021 0.190 0.134 -0.361 -0.144 0.019 0.366 -0.253 -0.156 -0.014 0.053 0.137 0.009 -0.255 1
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A3. Additional information on the validity of instrumental variables 
The findings in Table 5 demonstrate that the instrumental variables that measure foreign bank 
regulatory restrictions (RESFB) and foreign bank denied applications (DENBFB) have a 
negative and significant at the 1% level effect on the foreign bank presence variable 
(lnFBNUM). Here we provide evidence from fixed effect models that these instrumental 
variables (RESFB and DENFB) do not exert a statistically significant direct effect on our 
measures of entrepreneurship (lnNewentry and lnNascent). The models in Table A3 include 
also the other explanatory variables of entrepreneurship that we do not report in this table to 
economise space. We further validate the weak and not statistically significant relationship 
between the two instrumental variables and the two measures of entrepreneurships in panel 
VAR models. 
Table A3: The effect of foreign bank regulatory restrictions (RESFB) and foreign bank 
application denial (DENFB) on entrepreneurship 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
DENFB -0.239 -0.0133 
 (0.191) (0.177) 
RESFB 0.0487 0.106 
 (0.0763) (0.0927) 
Constant -13.69*** -5.783 
 (2.363) (4.405) 
   
Observations 
F-test p-value 
Time effects 
582 
0.000 
yes 
255 
0.000 
yes 
R-squared 0.327 0.179 
Countries 76 44 
Note: The dependent variable in model 1 is the natural logarithm 
of the new firm entry rates (lnENT) from the World Bank 
Entrepreneurship Database. The dependent variable in model 2 is 
the natural logarithm of nascent entrepreneurship (lnNascent) from 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. Both models are estimated 
with fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
